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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JERRY MARCELLIN,

)
)

)
Respondent and Plaintiff,

)

)
-vs.-

)

Case No. 8944

)
DELBERT OSGUTHORPE,

)

)
Appellant and Defendant.

)

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

FACTS OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts the version of the
facts presented by the Appellant on pages
1 and 2 of his brief but takes the following view of the facts discussed by Appellant
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on page 3 of his brief.

After the· Appel-

lant stopped to aid the driver of the Cadillac, he testified that he observed the
headlights of Plaintiff's automobile approaching.

As soon as he saw the car coming,

he started to back up (T.67).

He was aware

there was a situation of peril (T.63).

He

continued backing to a point where his right
wheels were off the blacktop before Plaintiff's automobile ricocheted from the rear
bumper of the Cadillac into the left front
fender of his truck: (T. 67).

The impact

pushed his truck back another two or three
feet, and it came to rest with its left
front at a point 27 feet diagonally across
the road from the left rear of the Cadillac

(T.47).

The testimony varied as to the

width of the space between the Cadillac
and the truck through which Plaintiff might
have passed, depending upon the observer
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who testified.
(T.l8,19}o

Respondent said 8 or 10 ·feet

Anyway, the jury found that it

was wide enough so that if the Plaintiff
had been able to see, he had a clear chance
to pass through without striking either of
the vehicleso
Respondent testified that as he approached Appellant's truck, be was blinded by its
lights and he saw the tail light of the Cadillac only after he had broken through the
glare of these lights, a distance of 50 or
60 feet from the Cadillac (T.7,25}.

Ap-

pellant states in his brief that Respondent saw the Cadillac when 250 feet from
it.

This is not our interpretation of the

testimony.

Following a series of rather

bewildering questions on cross-examination,
Respondent·stated that his lights when on
dim illuminated objects 350 feet ahead
(T.27}.

He also said that the first sign
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he saw of the Cadillac was its tail light

50 or 60 feet away, which was illuminated
itselfo

Apparently, confused by the manner

in wbich the question was put, he admitted
on cross-examination that he first saw
the Cadillac when his lights struck it.
Counsel would have the Court infer from
this that he saw the Cadillac when he was

350 feet from ito

The jury obviously did

not so conclude, and we submit none of the
testimony bears this out 0
Respondent testified that he could
not have stopped in this short distance
after he saw the tail lights.

Had it not

been for the b1inding lights, he could have
turned out and avoided the Cadillac throughout most of the distance.

After Respond-

ent reached a point 200 to 250 feet from
the Defendant, at which time he concluded
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that the Defendant would not dim his
lights, he eased off his accelerator and
lost perhaps 5 miles an hour of speed.
When he did see the Cadillac, he was able
to swerve

t~

the left

f~r

enough so that

its bumper scraped his car for a depth of
only two or three inches, and this thrust
him to the left into th& trucko
ARGUMENT

I

As to Defendant's contention that the
doctrine of last clear chance should not
have been submitted to the jury in this
case:
As Respondent traveled the last 250
feet to the point of impact, he was unaware
of his peril, but throughout part of this
distance, he was not in an inextricable
position; that is to say, he could have
slowed down to 10 or 15 miles per hour, and
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when he reached the point 50 feet from
the Cadillac where he first saw it, he
would have been able to turn out and miss
it.

However, as he prbceeded along through

this distance, he reached a point where,
due to the slickness of the road, he could
no longer slow sufficiently to turn out
and miss the Cadillac within the 50 feet.
He had the·n reached a point of inextricable peril as far.as anything he could
have done for himself was concerned.
However, for some additional distance,
it was still possible for the Appellant
to save Respondent by dimming his lights.
This is so because throughout this distance the Respondent, even at the speed
he was going, could still have swerved to
the left sufficiently to avoid the Cadillac
if he could have seen.

He finally reached
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a point where, even if he had been able to
see, he would still not have been able to
swerve and avoid the accident.

Very short-

ly after this, he saw the red light and
attempted unsuccessfully to avoid it.

The

jury accepted this analySis of the physical
facts.
I call the Court's attention to the
following two diagrams:
EFFECT OF THE LIGHTS.

X

~;ac
}\

( ( ?!

-------

--------------

-----

I
-----------

=-~---r.,._•:]_ _ _
/1_.--_.,_.'.......
,i_/_:;,(--.~'_()_i_~_.--_.

---

l

s_l....,.&:t;;..._#/?_./_.s_·

?"'_·

·-----

Not till Plaintiff breaks through the

beam of Defendan£•s lights at point

x, 50

feet from the Cadillac, does he see the
gleam of its tail lightG

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Position of'
Cadillac

Point
whel;"e
Plfo saw
Cadillac

y

X

Last point
where Plf.
at 30± mph
could have
steered out
of peril if
he could have
seen

c

Last point where
Plf. could have
slowed from 35±
mph to such speed,
say 10-15 mph, as
would have permitted
him to steer out in
last 50 feet
B

Point where
Plf" concluded Def.
would not
dim

A
'ex>

50'-60 1

From A to B, Plaintiff is not in inextricable peril but is unaware of
his danger.
From B to

c,

Plaintiff is in inextricable peril, but Defendant can

still save hime
After

c,

nothing can be donee
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Appellant first claims that the doctrine of last clear chance in Utah is based
largely upon proximate cause and asserts
that if Plaintiff's negligence continues
up to the time of the injury and is a proximate cause thereof, last clear chance is
not applicable.
I submit this is totally unsound.

In

substantially all of the last clear chance
cases, the negligence of the Plaintiff continued up to the time of injurye

The Utah

Court has characterized the doctrine as
the humanitarian doctrine and stressed the
fact that in all cases where it applies,
the negligence of the Plaintiff does continue to the time of the accidente

The

case of Compton et al. v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company (Utah, 1951) 235 P.
2d 515, cited by the Appellant is simply
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not in point.

When in that case the Court

uses the words, "the injured person's negligence has not come to rest," it does not
mean that the negligence has ceased.

What

it means is that the negligence, either in
the form of

inattent~veness

or the form of

a course of action which has resulted in
inextricable peril, has fixed the subsequent
course of events so that the Defendant,
as a reasonable person, should realize that
the peril exists, hence the last clear chance.
The Court in effect says in the Compton case
that it was not yet apparent to the Defendant that the Plaintiff's negligence would
continue or persist until she was in a position of inextricable peril.

This is point-

ed out by the Defendant in his reference
to the case of Holmgren v. Union Pacific
R. Co.,

(Utah, 1948), 198 P. 2d 459.
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In our case, the Defendant has admitted knowing that the situation of peril
had come into being.
This problem is extensively annotated
in 92 ALR 47, 119 ALR 1041 and 171 ALR

365.

For purposes of analysis in the notes,

this class of cases is broken into categories as follows:
FIRST CATEGORY:

Danger actually dis-

covered by Defendant; injured person physically unable to escape.
SECOND CATEGORY:

Danger actually dis-

covered by Defendant; injured person physically able to escape.
THIRD CATEGORY:

Danger not actually

discovered by Defendant, but ought to have
been; injured person physically unable to
escape.
In our case, the last category would
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not be involved inasmuch as the Defendant
testified that he was aware of the peril-that he saw the Plaintiff was not slowing
down.
However, I submit the Plaintiff here
ran through the first two categories, that
is, as he approached the scene, he was at
)

first in peril because he was unaware of
the danger but was physically able to slow
down and escap-e

the peril in spite of being

blinded by the headlights.

This was the

second category listed above.

However,

he reached a point where it was too late
to slow down enough (due to the slick road
which precl;uded heavy application of brakes)
to steer aside with only a 50-foot view of
the perilG

Yet for some distance, he could

still have turned aside if the lights had
been dimmed.

From that point to the point
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where there was no opportunity to even
steer out of peril, he was in category
number onee

This was the basis of sub-

mission of the

instruct~on

to the jury.

As a second argument in Appellant's
first point, Appellant argues in effect
that even if the Defendant had dimmed his
lights, it would still be necessary for
Plaintiff to take a further step, i.e. to
guide his car between the Cadillac and the
trucke

He claims that this precludes the

application of the doctrine of last clear
chance to this casee

I feel this point

can be answered by reference to any of
the so-called "warning" cases.

These are

numerous and indicate that the doctrine
is applicable where a warning may cause
the'Plaintiff to take the necessary action
to avoid the peril.

The Appellant cites
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certain dictum from the case of Graham v.
Johnson, et,al.,

(Utah, 1946), 166 P. 2d

230, and on re-hearing, 172 P. 2d 665.

We feel, however, that the case supports
our positiono

In that case, the Plain-

tiff, a 13-year old boy, was playing football in the street with two companions.
This was in violation of the city ordinance.

Defendant drove along the street,

and from the testimony the jury might
have found that she drove toward the Plaintiff.

The Court pointed out that she had

a duty of due care because of the circumstance of the presence of the boys in the
street~

She failed to sound her horn and

warn the bo,y s

of her approach.

As she

approached the boys, one of them called
a warning to the Plaintiff, whose back
was toward the driver and he started running diagonally across the street, and thus
the collision resulted.

It was this fail-
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ure to sound the horn and warn, which was
relied upon by the Plaintiff as a-basis
for an application of the last clear chance
doctrine.

In h6lding the doctrine might

apply, this Court clearly acknowledges that
an affirmative act by the Plaintiff would
'be required to remove himself from the
line of the peril or to avoid getting into
the line of peril.
This appears to me to be the same pro•
blem facing the Plaintiff in the principal case, although in this case the dimming of the lights, rather than the sounding of the horn, was the step which could
have been taken to

enable him to avert the

peril toward which he was then directed.
Besides the Graham case, the case of
Morley v. Rogers, 252 Pe 2d 231, also deals
with the situation where the Plaintiff will
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have to take affir.mative action to save
himself after warning.

Again the Court

held the doctrine applicable 0
The last point made by the Appellant
is that the last clear chance doctrine
has limited application to cases involving moving vehicles.

In t4e Graham case,

the Plaintiff was moving.

In the Morley

case' be was riding a bicycle and veered
out in front of the Defendant.

The Court

held that this did not matter.

It said

that by sounding his horn, the Defendant
could have caused the Plaintiff to turn
back to the right and out of the way "and
avoid the collision."
In the case of Beckstrom v, Williams,

3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P, 2d 309, the Court
also deals with a moving Plaintiff.

The
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Court has this to say:
"A rule has been expressed in a
case where two automobiles collided
that the doctrine of last clear chance
'is of limited application in the
case of two moving vehicles.•

We

appreciate that application of the
doctrine in a case where both vehicles were moving·and rapidly changing positibns with respect to one
another is fraught with difficulties.
There is the unlikelihood that one
driver would have a clear chance to
observe the inability of the other
to avoid a collision and still have
time and opportunity thereafter to
avoid it himselfQ

We therefore do

not believe that the extension of
the application of the 'doctrine in
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such situations should be encouraged.
But the reason for the limitation
of the doctrine as just discussed
is much less cogent where one vehicle was

movi~g

very slowly as

here."
As the Court points out, the

~octrine

is not likely to be applicable with two
rapidly moving vehicles.

our case.

But that is not

One is nearly standing still

and where this happens to be the Defendant, there is just as much room to apply
the doctrine as where it is the Plaintiff
who is moving rapidly into a trap set by
the Defendant.
II

It follows that if the doctrine of
the last clear chance applies in this case,
the District Court properly entered judg-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
ment for the Plaintiff on the Special Verdict.

CONCLUSION
On the fundamental question of whether
the Defendant had a clear chance to avoid
the accident, I wish to stress that a
mere dimming of the lights at the proper
time would have permitted the Plaintiff
to have avoided the collision, which occurred with an impact of only about three
inches depth.

The jury apparently felt

that this was so, and I

submit that De-

fendant here had as much chance to avoid
this accident as any of the Defendants
did in any of the cases cited hereinabove

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
GLEN M. HATCH
Attorney for
Respondent and Plaintiff
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